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INTRODUCTION AND A BIT OF HISTORY
Juries were once the primary government regulators in America.1
Throughout the eighteenth century and well into the nineteenth, at
a time when legislation was rare and the executive branch weak,
juries not only adjudicated legal disputes but, through court cases,
enforced taxes, determined welfare rolls, mandated highway
repairs, and generally oversaw public business.2 In the early days
of the Republic, the decisions of juries were also viewed as determin-
ing the law of the land, hence defining the legal standards for
proper conduct.3 With the growth of the other branches of govern-
ment—and the judiciary’s assertion in the nineteenth century of
control over law fixing—the jury lost its role as the chief regulator
of societal conduct.4 Yet, the regulatory function of juries never
entirely ended. The jury’s determination of reasonableness in
negligence cases provides an example of its continuing participation
in the establishment of the parameters of proper social conduct.
Today, legislatures and executive bodies generate huge volumes
of legal regulations and are the central instruments of governance.5
Yet these bodies have, in a number of areas, faced substantial
impediments to regulation. Some of these impediments are built
into the American way of doing things. Samuel Issacharoff has
explored the American inclination to allow free entry into markets
and the legal consequences of that approach.6 Such a policy has
fostered dramatic business growth but has also meant that there
may be few fixed regulations or standards to address harmful
1. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF
LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830, at 13-23 (1975).
2. See Stephan Landsman, The Civil Jury in America: Scenes from an Unappreciated
History, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 579, 592-94 (1993) (noting the broad power of colonial American
juries in legal, social, and economic matters).
3. See NELSON, supra note 1, at 3.
4. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 140-
41 (1977) (detailing the rise of legal practitioners to “position[s] of political and intellectual
domination” in postrevolutionary American society).
5. See Marc Galanter, Law Abounding: Legalization Around the North Atlantic, 55 MOD.
L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1992).
6. See Samuel Issacharoff, Regulating After the Fact, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 375, 377 (2007). 
2014] JURIES AS REGULATORS OF LAST RESORT 1063
activities.7 This has necessitated frequent resort to courts and
juries.8 Where regulation has been undertaken, the well-heeled and
well-connected have often been able to powerfully influence the
regulatory process.9 Sometimes this has amounted to the “capture”
of the regulatory machinery by the regulated.10 The substantial
likelihood of such capture is suggested by the economist George
Stigler’s observation that, when regulatory machinery is set up, it
is often “acquired by the industry and is designed and operated
primarily for its benefit.”11
In addition to outright capture, members of various regulated
industries secure sympathetic treatment from regulators in a
variety of other ways.12 The desire among some regulators for future
employment has led them to refrain from zealous enforcement.13
When enforcement is undertaken, it is often based on information
prepared and provided by the regulated. Such material is likely to
favor industry claims14 or simply overwhelm regulators because of
its volume and complexity.15 To add to the normal challenges
regulators face, they are often hampered by inadequate budgets,16
as well as the possibility of funding cuts engineered by politically
powerful members of a regulated industry.17 In a number of
circumstances,  those potentially subject to oversight have also been
able to use their economic power and communications skills (honed
7. See id. at 384-87.
8. Id. at 377 n.13.
9. See Susan Randall, Insurance Regulation in the United States: Regulatory Federalism
and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 625, 667 (1999).
10. See id. at 639 & n.87.
11. George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI.
3, 3 (1971), quoted in Barak Orbach, What is Regulation?, 30 YALE J. ON REG. ONLINE 1, 52
n.18 (2012).
12. See Randall, supra note 9, at 639 (explaining how the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners is controlled by the insurance industry to an extent greater than
just “capture”).
13. See id. at 662 n.232.
14. Id. at 681.
15. See Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture,
59 DUKE L.J. 1321 (2010).
16. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV.
L. REV. 1669, 1686 (1975).
17. See Randall, supra note 9, at 682-83 (showing how, in the insurance context, the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners’ reliance on the industry for funding
hobbles its regulatory function).
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through advertising and public relations campaigns) to skew the
regulatory debate in their favor—as exemplified by the often cited
McDonald’s coffee spill episode.18 The result of these checks on the
efficiency and integrity of regulators is the creation of a less than
perfect regulatory mechanism containing gaps, many of them
perpetuated by those who might otherwise have been subject to
scrutiny.
It will be this Article’s contention that the civil jury has been
pressed into service by the judiciary on a number of occasions to
address situations where a regulatory gap is perceived, administra-
tive intervention—either grounded in a pre-existing statutory duty
or prompted by court directive—seems hopeless, and the need for a
rule to restrain the powerful from gross overreaching appears
essential. What the jury has become in these circumstances is a
regulator of last resort—albeit one without the focus or expertise of
an executive agency or legislative committee, but one charged to
respond nevertheless. Part I of this Article will examine the judge’s
and jury’s roles in considering otherwise under or unregulated
situations and the reasons why courts have been inclined, at least
sometimes, to turn such matters over to juries. Part II will use the
development of the tort of bad faith in insurance transactions as a
case study of the growth of the use of the jury as a last resort
regulator. This Part, while briefly considering the early history of
the bad faith tort, will concentrate most of its attention on a series
of California cases decided between 1958 and 1979. California’s
decisions steadily expanded the bad faith tort from its narrow
beginnings in so-called third-party situations, where an insurance
carrier failed to honor an obligation to defend the interests of its
insured against claims by others, to the much more common first
party settings where an insurer, for one reason or another, denied
a compensation claim by its own insured. Part II will analyze the
California courts’ expressed reasons for acting, including the
insured’s and company’s circumstances, as well as broader policy
concerns. Part III will explore possible unarticulated motivations,
18. See generally WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS,
MEDIA AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS (2004); Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, “The Impact that
It Has Had Is Between People’s Ears:” Tort Reform, Mass Culture, and Plaintiffs’ Lawyers, 50
DEPAUL L. REV. 453, 466-70 (2000). 
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like the absence of effective regulation and the capture by the
insurance industry of the regulatory apparatus. Part IV will
consider another area where the courts may be warranted in
turning to the jury as a regulator of last resort: bad faith manipula-
tion of adhesion—contract-imposed arbitration proceedings.
I. JUDICIAL TORT-BASED REGULATION
America’s courts have retained a significant role in law making,
most particularly in the tort area.19 They have continued the
common law tradition of addressing perceived wrongs by recogniz-
ing a right of action accruing to those harmed.20 In Blackstone’s
words: “[I]t is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is
a legal right, there is also a legal remedy, by suit or action at law,
whenever that right is invaded.”21 While creation of truly new torts
has been rare since the middle of the twentieth century, there are
at least four instances where a substantial number of courts have
created new causes of action.22 Two of these, the intentional
infliction of emotional distress (IIED) tort and the expanded
protection of privacy,23 might be characterized as responding to
heightened social sensitivity to the mental harms that tortfeasors
can do their victims. The parameters of the IIED tort are flexible, as
befits a cause of action about the myriad ways people and institu-
tions can cause substantial psychological harm.24 That said, courts
have concentrated on limiting actionable IIED claims to particularly
outrageous conduct that caused verifiable mental suffering.25 The
privacy tort concerns itself with a handful of ways defendants may
19. See George L. Priest, The Modern Transformation of Civil Law, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 957,
957-68 (2006).
20. See id. at 964.
21. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *23.
22. See Roger C. Henderson, The Tort of Bad Faith in First-Party Insurance Transactions:
Refining the Standard of Culpability and Reformulating the Remedies by Statute, 26 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 1, 1 (1992).
23. See id.
24. See Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of
Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 42, 42 (1982).
25. Id. at 57. 
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intrude upon and undermine the privacy of others.26 While the
privacy tort has its roots in the classic work of Warren and Brandeis
in 1890,27 it truly flowered in the latter part of the twentieth century
as the doctrines of intrusion, false light, misappropriation, and
publication of private facts were all fleshed out.28 Although both of
these torts are arguably regulatory in thrust because they seek to
curtail injurious behavior,29 the serious restrictions placed on their
scope by free speech concerns have narrowed their reach. This point
was illustrated when the Supreme Court recently decided in Snyder
v. Phelps that extraordinarily provocative behavior during the
funeral of a soldier killed in the war in Iraq was protected from an
IIED claim despite the great likelihood it would cause severe
emotional pain.30 Snyder relied on the limiting approach adopted by
the Supreme Court in earlier privacy law rulings, like that in
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell regarding Hustler Magazine’s brutal
parody about incest in an outhouse directed at the minister Jerry
Falwell.31 Moreover, it appears neither tort has been used to
regulate the conduct of a specific industry or relationship.
The remaining two “new” torts have been far more clearly
regulatory in thrust. The first of these torts is strict products
liability.32 Beginning in 1963 with Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc.,33 the courts developed a series of legal doctrines
designed to regulate the distribution of defective products dangerous
to the consuming public.34 The judiciary stepped into a setting in
which American industry was not extensively regulated and insisted
on more regulation to ensure the manufacture of safe products.35
26. Courts have extended the concept of IIED into the realm of negligently inflicted
emotional distress (NIED), but with substantial additional limits, beginning with the
California Supreme Court decision in Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968). For analysis
of the development of the NIED tort, see PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 359-66
(W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984).
27. See generally Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890).
28. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 26.
29. See Priest, supra note 19, at 957.
30. 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011).
31. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
32. See Priest, supra note 19, at 964-68.
33. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
34. See Priest, supra note 19, at 964-68.
35. See id.
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The courts thus became the guardians of a broad swath of consumer
interests.36 Since the 1980s this regulatory activity appears to have
slowed, but the courts continue to consider consumer products
safety questions.37
The other new tort created in this period was the insurance bad
faith tort.38 This one also had an intensely regulatory thrust,
focusing on the perceived misconduct of one particular industry, the
providers of insurance coverage. Unlike products liability doctrine,
the bad faith tort has continued to expand and has played an
ongoing part in regulating the conduct of insurance companies.39
In these tort-based contexts, the key mechanism by which
authority has been exercised is the verdicts of juries in civil cases.
Juries have been asked to say when conduct is so outrageous as to
be an intentional infliction of emotional distress, so intrusive as to
violate our notions of privacy, so risky as to make a product
defective, and so outside the expectations of good faith and fair
dealing as to deny the reasonable expectations of insurance
purchasers. In each of these settings the jury’s focus is not some
narrowly defined legal requirement but a far broader question of
appropriate conduct in the circumstances. One might object that
none of this is “real” regulation. To address that point, it is neces-
sary, first, to clarify what the act of regulation entails and, second,
to ask if jury decisions truly regulate. Perhaps surprisingly, there
is no widely agreed upon definition of regulation.40 In the wake of
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,41 Barak
Orbach turned to this question, one central to the debate within the
Supreme Court about President Obama’s healthcare initiative.42
Orbach agrees with those who argue that we do not have a fixed and
36. Id. at 973-77 (explaining how increased attachment of legal liability forces
manufacturers to internalize costs and risk of harm).
37. See generally James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution
in Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REV. 479 (1989).
38. See Henderson, supra note 22, at 1.
39. See id. at 3 (detailing the rise of bad faith breach of insurance contract claims).
40. See Orbach, supra note 11, at 2 n.5 (detailing the views of a number of scholars who
have concluded that there is no settled definition of regulation). 
41. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
42. See generally Orbach, supra note 11, at 1-6 (describing how the definition of the word
“regulation” would impact judicial interpretations of legislative and executive actions due to
its frequent reference by administrative agencies).
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settled definition.43 That said, he advances several proposals,
perhaps the most useful of which for present purposes is “govern-
ment intervention in the private domain or a legal rule that
implements such intervention. The implementing rule is a binding
legal norm created by a state organ that intends to shape the
conduct of individuals and firms.”44 This definition suggests the
breadth of regulatory activity and recognizes that “our regulatory
landscape does not originate in administrative agencies.”45 Court
and jury action in the settings described above are certainly
interventions in the private domain. Such interventions may result
in a sizeable award of damages by the jury if it concludes that
inappropriate conduct has been demonstrated by the evidence
produced.
The second question is whether jury verdicts create binding legal
norms of the sort that courts and affected parties will recognize as
shaping conduct. Jury decisions may create norms in a number of
ways. Most directly, verdicts suggest that similar cases are likely to
produce similar results. This, at a minimum, informs attentive
lawyers of the potential strength of certain legal and factual
combinations for the purposes of claims and settlement.46 Most
significantly, such verdicts and the facts that undergird them may
have a powerful influence on the judiciary—signaling societal
attitudes about the direction in which legal requirements should
move. Perhaps the best illustration of this point is to be found in the
development and eventual rejection of the doctrine of contributory
negligence, which occurred over the course of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries.47 During this process, a rule of reasonable
conduct administered by juries came to be seen as a better way of
addressing the relative degrees of fault of contending parties rather
than a series of rigid, fixed precepts established and enforced by
judicial decree.48 
43. Id. at 6.
44. Id. (italics omitted).
45. Id. at 5.
46. See Robert I. Rubin, Remove Guesswork from Calculating Damages in Personal Injury
Cases, 58 DEF. COUNSEL J. 16, 16-17 (1991).
47. See Landsman, supra note 2, at 606-10.
48. See id.
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When first created in England in 1809, the doctrine of contribu-
tory negligence did not seem to be intended as a tool to promote
judicial, rather than jury, control of legal regulation.49 By the middle
of the nineteenth century, however, American judges were vigor-
ously applying the doctrine to curb perceived jury generosity
regarding negligence claims.50 This was part of a more general move
toward judicial control over negligence liability and the establish-
ment of more particularized legal requirements regarding conduct.51
Professor Wex Malone, one of the leading analysts of contributory
negligence, concluded: “Courts wanted to control juries during the
last century [the nineteenth], they want to control them today, and
they will probably want to control them in the future. If we take
away contributory negligence from the judges they will find some
other way.”52 If the proposition is correct that judges will always
find a way to control juries, then juries are little more than puppets
manipulated by judges and have only the smallest part to play in
regulating conduct.
If Malone’s conclusion were the end of the contributory negli-
gence story, one would have to conclude that judges, not juries,
really control common law regulation, even with regard to such
expansive terms as reasonableness.53 But Malone’s vision was not
the end of the story. Juries resisted judicial efforts to deny plaintiffs
all recovery when they were no more than marginally at fault by
making awards that challenged judicial dictates.54 This resistance
eventually called into question the soundness of the harsh and
unrealistic tenets of contributory negligence.55 In the guise of
respecting jury decisions regarding questions of fact and jury
determinations of reasonableness, the courts retreated to ever less
determinative rules leaving more and more in the hands of jurors to
be decided on a case-by-case basis.56 In 1938, Fleming James, one of
49. See id. at 606.
50. See id. at 606-08.
51. Id. at 606-07.
52. Wex S. Malone, The Formative Era of Contributory Negligence, 41 U. ILL. L. REV. 151,
182 (1946).
53. See generally id.
54. See Landsman, supra note 2, at 608-09 (arguing that judges relied on proactive juries
to soften “harsh tort doctrines”).
55. See id. at 610 (referencing the judiciary’s “ill-conceived” contribution rule).
56. See id. at 606-12.
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the leading tort scholars of his day, described the developing judicial
solution to contributory negligence as “simpler and vaguer formulas
in instructions to the jury.”57 The law of contributory negligence
gave way to comparative negligence.58 It was not that regulation
through the law of negligence had been abandoned, but that flexible
principles demanding a jury’s weighing of evidence and equities
were being utilized.
The shift involved in the contributory negligence context is neatly
illustrated by a pair of cases decided by the United States Supreme
Court. In the first, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., wielding the
full power of judges as seemingly exclusive lawmakers in tort, ruled
in Baltimore & Ohio Railroad v. Goodman that jury awards were to
be rejected in railroad intersection collision cases if the motorists
crossing the railroad tracks did not stop their cars, alight, look and
listen.59 Not only was such driver behavior impractical, especially in
urban settings where there was substantial vehicular traffic, but it
also conflicted with the custom then developing among operators of
automobiles across the nation. Judge Holmes sought to definitively
regulate automobile operation at railroad crossings. His approach
held sway for a brief seven years and was then overridden by
Justice Benjamin Cardozo in Pokora v. Wabash Railway Co.60 There
the Supreme Court returned intersection regulation back to the
jury.61
The Court’s motivation for empowering juries in the Pokora line
of cases was to allow them to closely scrutinize the facts of each case
and, in light of those facts, decide the question of reasonable
conduct. Judges were ceding control of regulation to juries. Hard
and fast judicial mandates were rejected in favor of sensible, rough
and ready standards bottomed on daily experience and a community
sense of appropriateness. Justice Cardozo emphasized that in this
setting, it was up to the jury to frame “standards of behavior” and
not for judges to impose “rules of law.”62
57. Fleming James, Jr., Last Clear Chance: A Transitional Doctrine, 47 YALE L.J. 704, 723
(1938). 
58. See Landsman, supra note 2, at 609-10.
59. 275 U.S. 66, 70 (1927).
60. 292 U.S. 98 (1934).
61. Id. at 101.
62. See id. at 105.
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It might be protested that verdicts are not regulatory. After all,
they articulate no rules for the future. But courts have seen it
differently. In cases like Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., regarding
regulation in the handling of nuclear materials,63 and Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc., addressing the impact of regulations regarding
warnings on cigarette packages,64 the Supreme Court made clear
that a state law damages remedy has an inherently regulatory
effect. It is important to note that these cases arose in legal settings
where the standard governing conduct was established by federal
regulatory action preempting a field.65 Yet, state safety concerns, as
expressed through jury judgments fixing damages, were recognized
not only as legitimate but as serving valid regulatory ends, most
particularly insisting on safer conduct in highly regulated indus-
tries.66
It is a fair question to ask why the courts have turned to juries to
do what amounts to regulation in these settings. First, of course,
cases at law are required by the federal67—and virtually every
state’s68—Constitution to be tried by a jury. These constitutional
requirements mean that courts will use juries when they fashion
new torts. That answer, however, elides the deeper appeal of the
jury as a regulator when no other regulatory mechanism appears to
be available and no other governmental body seems willing or able
to act.
The jury has a number of characteristics that mark it as an
attractive choice for the regulation of actors who have proven
impervious to the more usual forms of oversight. As frequently
noted, the jury is the voice of the community.69 It brings to bear the
63. 464 U.S. 238, 240-41 (1984).
64. 505 U.S. 504, 508-09 (1992).
65. See Landsman, supra note 2, at 617-19.
66. See, e.g., David E. Izhakoff, Federal Preemption: State Regulation of Federally Owned
Nuclear Production Plants, 1989 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 665, 674-77.
67. U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by
a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to
the rules of the common law.”).
68. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16 (“[T]rial by jury is an inviolate right and shall be
secured to all.”); Selection of Jurors, 50 STATE STATUTORY SURVEYS: CIVIL LAWS: CIVIL
PROCEDURE, Apr. 2013, available on Westlaw at 0020 SURVEYS 13. 
69. See Landsman, supra note 2, at 616-19.
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views of a cross section of the public. This is particularly valuable
in situations where other regulatory efforts are absent and the
parameters of public concern have not otherwise been defined.
Moreover, this cross section is uniquely representative.70 It does not
suffer from the professional and political winnowing processes that
make legislators, executive officials, and judges unrepresentative of
the wide variety of educational, social, and ethnic backgrounds of
the polity. Its representativeness makes it far less vulnerable to
special appeals, bias, or prejudice in favor of any industry, political
orientation, or ideology. Representativeness lends legitimacy to jury
decisions, which usually are not associated with special interests.
Legitimacy is reinforced by the public visibility of jury proceedings
in which the evidence warranting action is laid out for all to see
rather than buried in the bowels of the bureaucratic process.71 By
the same token, the jury may draw on a wellspring of practical
experience and common sense. These resources may be particularly
valuable in a regulatory context in which the question to be
answered is whether conduct is reasonable or appropriate in
settings where jurors have first-hand experience as clients or
consumers.
There are a number of other considerations that argue in favor of
juries. Juries offer the courts decision makers who are uniquely
anonymous. There is little prospect of locating jurors in advance of
litigation in hopes of manipulating them. As Blackstone remarked:
A competent number of sensible and upright jurymen, chosen by
lot from among those of the middle rank, will be found the best
investigators of truth and the surest guardians of public justice.
For the most powerful individual in the state will be cautious of
committing any flagrant invasion of another’s right, when he
knows that the fact of his oppression must be examined and
decided by twelve indifferent men, not appointed till the hour of
trial; and that, when once the fact is ascertained, the law must
of course redress it. This therefore preserves in the hands of the
70. See Stephan Landsman, The Civil Jury in America, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 285,
288 (1999) (remarking that juries are made up of distinct individuals who are not predisposed
in any one direction).
71. See Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 8 (1995).
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people that share which they ought to have in the administra-
tion of public justice, and prevents the encroachments of the
more powerful and wealthy citizens.72
This insulation makes juries an ideal mechanism for addressing
questions affecting those predisposed to attempt to influence
decision makers, something certain industries have been quite
adept at with regard to legislatures and executive agencies. Further,
the fact that juries are perceived as less predictable than other sorts
of regulators may heighten their regulatory efficacy. It is difficult to
feel comfortable taking an extreme position when a jury judgment
looms that is likely to punish tactics that appear outside the
mainstream. Additionally, the use of the jury process to regulate is
quite cheap. No bureaucratic apparatus needs to be maintained.
Private parties will take on the effort of investigating and prosecut-
ing claims so long as there is a decent prospect of substantial
monetary recovery.
Juries offer a number of further social and political benefits to the
judges who call them into action. If a verdict turns out to be
provocative, the jury can be blamed rather than the courts.73 In this
way, juries deflect political heat from the judicial branch. Connected
to this point is Judge Guido Calabresi’s argument that jurors are
the decision makers best suited to make extremely difficult or
“tragic” choices,74 like those involving life or death,75 or the most
challenging applications of moral principles.76 Part of the strength
of jury decision making in this context is the jury’s ability to apply
social standards without ever precisely defining those standards.77
This produces not only decisions but guidelines to the exercise of
moral judgment without the need for a precise articulation that is
vulnerable to attack or distortion. 
What juries are asked to do is distinct from the sort of regulation
judges engage in when they redraft regulations in the guise of
72. BLACKSTONE, supra note 21, at *380.
73. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443,
459-60 (1899).
74. GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 63-64 (1978).
75. See id. at 57-58.
76. See id. at 64.
77. See id. at 57.
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reviewing them78 or discipline regulators who fail to do their job.79
Rather, it is the judiciary turning to the jury, asking jurors to
scrutinize the facts regarding each defendant’s conduct and to reach
verdicts assessing that conduct in a setting where no specific
standards exist. It is a means of insisting on appropriate behavior
by punishing practices that fall outside what the community, upon
reflection, finds acceptable. The dissemination of such determina-
tions both in the press and among those facing potentially similar
claims establishes a rough but discernible regulatory framework. In
turning to juries this way, judges harness the particular power of
jurors to determine facts, to apply principles of fair dealing, and to
bring to bear widely shared but hard to articulate expectations
about the way people and organizations ought to behave. Commen-
tators have frequently noted the widespread judicial respect for
juries and the decisions they render.80 It should come as no surprise
that judges might turn to juries for the regulation of conduct for
which no other mechanism is available.
II. THE BAD FAITH TORT: A CASE STUDY IN LAST RESORT REGULA-
TION BY JURIES
A. Pre-1950 Developments
The bad faith tort in insurance transactions, like other new torts,
has roots in legal activity stretching back well beyond its formaliza-
tion in the era after 1950. At the end of the nineteenth century,
some legislatures and courts began to grapple with a cluster of
seemingly unfair insurance company claims practices.81 One
particularly troubling practice was insurer use of contract terms
that obliged payment of a claim only if the customer had both
suffered an adverse judgment and, out of his or her own pocket, paid
78. This strategy was considered and perhaps constrained in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984). But see Thomas W. Merrill,
Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 982 (1992).
79. Susan N. Herman & Lawrence M. Solan, Jury in the Twenty-First Century, 66 BROOK.
L. REV. 971, 982 (2001).
80. See id. at 982.
81. See Henderson, supra note 22, at 16-19 (highlighting indemnity insurance contracts
as an example of these unfair practices).
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that judgment.82 This “indemnity” provision often undercut the
reason why the insured had purchased the insurance. The provision
paid those clients who needed financial protection the least and
denied protection to those who needed it the most because of their
limited ability to pay an adverse judgment on their own.83 Eventu-
ally, court pressure led insurers to abandon this approach.84 But
insurers persisted in their use of other practices that delayed or
denied payments to those claiming insurance coverage.85 Despite the
widespread nature of the problem and the obvious economic
incentives for withholding payment, few state legislatures reacted
in a serious way to this challenge. Those that did took only the
modest step of authorizing the award of interest on funds improp-
erly withheld and, in a few instances, the imposition of attorneys’
fees to offset the expense to which insureds were put to recover
contractually required payments.86 As late as 1950, no more than
one-quarter of the states had adopted these modest regulatory
requirements.87 In virtually all cases, the ceiling for recovery (apart
from interest and fees) was defined by the contract and was limited
to nothing more than the contractually stipulated amount.88 Self-
interested negotiating tactics, incentives for insurer refusal to pay,
and delay were virtually unaffected by these remedies because few
insureds had the wherewithal to contest company action in court
proceedings.
Into this legal setting in 1930, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
introduced a new concept and approach to insurance company
claims practices when it decided Hilker v. Western Automobile
Insurance Co.89 Western Automobile Insurance, which had a
contractual duty to defend its insured and concomitant control of
litigation involving third-party claims, refused a reasonable settle-
ment offer within policy limits.90 The company instead decided to
take the auto accident case to trial motivated, no doubt, by the hope
82. See id. at 16.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 18-19.
85. See id. at 11-12.
86. See id. at 12.
87. See id. at 13 n.43.
88. See id. at 12.
89. 231 N.W. 257 (Wisc. 1930).
90. See id. at 260.
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of reducing its outlay.91 At trial, the jury returned a verdict for twice
the policy limits.92 The court noted the company’s contractual right
to control the litigation, the possibility of a serious conflict of
interest between insurer and insured, and Western’s exclusive
pursuit of its own financial objectives.93 This combination led the
court to conclude that the insurer had breached its duty of good
faith to and fair dealing with its insured, warranting the court to
order the insurer to pay the entire judgment, including the amount
above the policy limit.94 The court’s holding created a new remedy,
but the scope of that remedy was narrowly circumscribed by the size
of the award in the underlying litigation. There was, as yet, little
latitude for jury appraisal of insurer misconduct.
B. The California Cases: 1958-1979
Hilker provided the basis for the California Supreme Court’s
analysis when it turned to the issue of insurer claims-related
misconduct in Comunale v. Traders General Insurance Company in
1958.95 The insurance company refused to defend its insured, Percy
Sloan, or participate in settlement negotiations after he was sued by
two pedestrians, Mr. and Mrs. Comunale, whom he had struck while
driving another party’s truck.96 The court decided that in cases like
Comunale in which the insured was sued by strangers to the
insurance contract, so-called third-party claims cases, the company
had an obligation to “take into account the interest of the insured
and give it at least as much consideration as it does its own inter-
est.”97 Here the company pursued its own interests exclusively,
denying that it had a duty to defend, a claim eventually rejected by
the courts,98 and absenting itself from settlement negotiations.
Cutting the insured off from assistance in the settlement process,
which in this case included an offer to settle within policy limits,99
91. See id. (finding the insurance company acted in bad faith by not settling).
92. See id. at 258.
93. See id. at 259-60.
94. See id. at 261.
95. 328 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1958).
96. See id. at 200.
97. Id. at 201.
98. See id. at 202.
99. See id. at 200.
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was deemed a breach of the duty of “good faith and fair dealing”100
as previously identified in Hilker.101 This was not simply a breach
of contract for which damages limited to the sum specified in the
contract would be appropriate but an independent wrong arising out
of the claims-handling process. It was a wrong that could be
described as “sounding in tort or in contract,”102 warranting
damages up to and including the full sum of the jury’s award in the
underlying case, which was approximately twice the coverage
amount.103 The court determined that the insurer’s duty stretched
well beyond the specific terms of the contract into the settlement
context which was viewed as a fundamental part of the insurance
relationship.104 When the company refused to participate in the
claims resolution process without complete legal justification, it
became obliged to pay the entirety of the judgment rendered. The
wrongs that led the court to act appeared to be a set of business
practices that maximized the prospect of protecting company assets
while exposing clients to substantial financial risk. The insurer was
not accused of dishonesty or malice; indeed, the conduct of neither
party was extensively examined by the Court. The narrow focus of
the decision was the insurer’s clear and single-minded pursuit of
company interests which, if proven to the jury, would warrant
protection of the policy holder from any award above policy limits. 
Nine years later the California Supreme Court returned to the
claims-practice question in Crisci v. The Insurance Co. of New
Haven, Connecticut.105 Again, the court scrutinized a jury decision
about an insurer’s behavior in a matter in which the insured was
being sued by a third party.106 This time the company had defended
its insured but declined an offer to settle for $10,000 (the policy
limit) in a case in which its claims manager and attorney both
thought there was significant likelihood of a much larger
100. Id. at 201.
101. See 231 N.W. 257, 261 (Wisc. 1930).
102. Id. at 202.
103. See id. at 200.
104. See id. at 201 (“It is common knowledge that a large percentage of the claims covered
by insurance are settled without litigation and that this is one of the usual methods by which
the insured receives protection.”).
105. 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967).
106. See id. at 175.
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judgment.107 The company appeared to decide that it might as well
attempt to convince a jury that a smaller verdict (or none at all) was
warranted because it had solid evidence and its own risk was
capped at $10,000. The case was tried and the jury awarded
$100,000.108 This award ruined the insured, a seventy-year-old
immigrant widow named Rosina Crisci.109 In the ensuing settlement
Mrs. Crisci lost the rental property that was her sole source of
income as well as everything else of value that she owned.110
According to the court, her health declined, she suffered bouts of
hysteria, and attempted suicide.111 She filed a bad faith action
against her insurer claiming not only monetary damages of the sort
sought in Comunale, but also mental distress for which the jury
awarded her $25,000.112 Citing its earlier decision, the Supreme
Court once again condemned one-sided, self-interested insurance
company claims handling practices.113 It declared that proof of
“dishonesty, fraud, or concealment” was not needed for there to be
liability.114 The key was a failure on the part of the insurer to act in
“the most reasonable manner” in the claims-handling process.115 The
insured had a right to rely on the company not to “gamble with the
insured’s money to further its own interests.”116 Turning to the
question of damages, the court picked up on Comunale’s observation
that bad faith cases sound in both tort and contract.117 The import
of this observation was that mental suffering, as well as monetary
loss, could be compensated and that the insured’s mental state could
be considered as a basis for damages in a jury award. Although not
expanding the group of claimants who could recover, Crisci dramati-
cally expanded the sums recoverable in such matters and the scope
of the jury’s scrutiny of the consequences of insurer misconduct.
Crisci heightened focus on the well-being of the insured and
107. See id. (“[B]oth men believed that if the jury felt that the fall triggered the psychosis,
a verdict of not less than $100,000 would be returned.”).
108. See id. at 176.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See id. 
112. See id. at 178.
113. See id. at 176-77.
114. Id. at 177.
115. Id. at 176-77. 
116. Id. at 177.
117. See id. at 178.
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imposed on insurance providers the necessity of considering the
unintended but injurious mental consequences of their self-inter-
ested business practices in third party initiated litigation. All of this
was to be triggered if a jury found that the insurer had acted in an
unreasonable manner in handling the claim. The jury was no longer
simply protecting insureds from excessive judgments; it was
scrutinizing insurer conduct affecting a designated subset of
customers and awarding damages if it found improper business
practices. 
The next holding in the history of the development of judge and
jury regulation of the California insurance industry was not a bad
faith claims-handling case, but rather one focusing on the distinct
duty of “an automobile liability insurer [to] undertake a reasonable
investigation of the insured’s insurability within a reasonable period
of time from the acceptance of the application and the issuance of a
policy.”118 Anthony Alves sought auto insurance from State Farm
Mutual.119 Without checking Mr. Alves’s driving record, State Farm
issued a policy.120 Seven months later, Alves struck and severely
injured a pedestrian, Eva Barrera.121 State Farm then initiated an
investigation of its insured and found a material misrepresentation
in Alves’s application for insurance—that despite his written denial,
his license had been suspended once and placed under probation
orders twice in the five years before he sought coverage from State
Farm.122 On the strength of this information, the company rescinded
its policy and refused to consider Ms. Barrera’s claim.123 Justice
Tobriner, writing for six of the seven members of the Supreme
Court, concluded that the jury was correct in finding that such
conduct breached a company’s duty to undertake a reasonable and
timely investigation of eligibility, in the absence of which someone
injured by the insured could, as a third party beneficiary, claim
coverage under the insurance contract.124
118. Barrera v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 456 P.2d 674, 677 (Cal. 1969).
119. See id. at 678.
120. See id. at 679-80.
121. See id. at 678.
122. See id. at 679. There was a significant dispute about whether Alves or a State Farm
agent had actually filled out the application. See id.
123. See id. at 680.
124. See id. at 685-86.
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According to evidence heard by the jury, State Farm failed to heed
the custom and practice of the insurance industry by not, at the
outset, seeking a Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) report of the
insured’s driving record.125 This was part of a cost reduction strategy
that allowed State Farm to avoid investigative expenses of $3.35 per
customer (of which 25 cents was for the purchase of the DMV
report).126 This “policy of saving minor costs on its part at the
expense and sacrifice of the interests of its insured and those of the
general public”127 deeply troubled the court and served as a basis for
its willingness to allow a jury to consider whether the company was
investigating in a reasonable manner. 
The court grounded its approval of jury intervention on a number
of legislative enactments and social considerations. First, the court
pointed out that, pursuant to California’s Financial Responsibility
Law, insurance companies were involved in a “quasi-public” activity
when they provided drivers with insurance coverage.128 State Farm’s
failure to investigate applicants in a timely manner meant that the
public might be denied protection from dangerous drivers, a serious
threat to the public at large. This undermining of the legislature’s
protective scheme was particularly troublesome because it was
engineered by an “economically powerful entity”129 utilizing an
adhesion contract that allowed it to rescind agreements to avoid
“any risk whatsoever”130 while innocent victims would go uncompen-
sated. The strategy of pursuing the company’s self-regarding
advantage without considering the public interest, all to save a few
dollars, was, in the court’s view, a sound basis for the jury’s
action.131 Relying on a duty much like that recognized in Comunale
and Crisci, “sounding either in tort or quasi-contract,”132 the court
held that the third party injured pedestrian could recover.133 In
essence, the court was asking the jury to determine whether there
had been appropriately prompt action on auto insurance applica-
125. See id. at 680.
126. See id.
127. Id.
128. See id. at 680-81.
129. Id. at 682.
130. Id.
131. See id. at 680-81.
132. Id. at 681.
133. See id. at 687-88.
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tions and the expenditure of appropriate sums on investigators. The
justices made room for the jury’s scrutiny by putting to the side
legislative enactments that appeared to grant insurers latitude in
making the rescission decision.134 Through the jury trial mechanism,
regulatory scrutiny of the insurance business was being steadily
expanded. This expansion occurred in the face of rules that,
arguably, insulated insurers from oversight.
The courtroom-based regulation of insurance claims-handling
procedures underwent further significant expansion when Califor-
nia’s Court of Appeal decided Fletcher v. Western National Life
Insurance Co. in 1970.135 This decision extended jury scrutiny of the
reasonableness of claims practice from its original setting in third
party claims cases to first party situations. In first party situations,
the insured was suing his or her own insurer for failing to fairly
evaluate or handle a claim made for injuries suffered by the insured
and potentially covered by the insurance agreement. In the third
party context, there had been particular legal grounds to allow a
finding of liability because the company involved had agreed to
assume responsibility for defending the insured, thereby triggering
something like a fiduciary duty to protect client interests.136 No such
fiduciary obligation could be found in the far more numerous first
party cases. In first party cases, the company and the insured were
always potential antagonists regarding coverage and the insurer did
not appear to have any particular obligation to represent its clients’
interests in any proceedings.
What led the appellate court to take the leap into the first party
setting becomes clear upon reading the Fletcher opinion. In Fletcher,
three factors combined to force the court’s hand: the scandalous
behavior of the insurer, the suffering of the insured, and the
previously recognized expansive tort remedy in third party cases.137
The defendant insurer in Fletcher conceded that its conduct had
been “deplorable and outrageous.”138 The insurer tried every trick it
134. See id. at 683 n.10 (“Thus, not only contractual provisions in, but also statutory
provisions governing, automobile insurance policies must be construed in light of the basic
public policy underlying the Financial Responsibility Law.”).
135. 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).
136. See Henderson, supra note 22, at 19-22.
137. See Fletcher, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 86-90.
138. Id. at 87 (internal quotations omitted).
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could think of to deprive Fletcher, an impecunious, hard-working
father of eight with a fourth grade education,139 of the $150 per
month his disability policy called for after he was injured “while
lifting a 361 pound bale of rubber” at work.140 The company’s claims
supervisor, Tom Amason—whose behavior was so egregious as to
warrant his being named individually as a defendant—with the
express approval of Western’s President, propounded bogus claims
about preexisting conditions, distorted medical opinions, and sought
to take advantage of Fletcher’s impoverished circumstances to
coerce his agreement to a benefits-denying settlement.141 Eventu-
ally, the insured obtained the assistance of skilled counsel.142 Suit
was brought seeking not only payment of the contractual amount,
but compensatory and punitive damages because of the company’s
fraudulent conduct and its IIED.143 The Court of Appeal suggested
that Western’s conduct warranted the jury’s finding of a “malicious
and bad faith refusal to pay plaintiff’s legitimate claim.”144
While considering the IIED claim the appeals court made it clear
that the plaintiff might recover by reliance on the bad faith tort
embraced in Crisci, which in essence coupled the bad faith and IIED
concepts.145 The court buttressed its ruling by providing a strikingly
detailed narrative of the evidence the jury had heard about the
hardships suffered by Mr. Fletcher because of his insurer’s conduct.
The opinion noted that the plaintiff’s family had been reduced to
eating nothing but “macaroni, beans and potatoes”146 and that the
plaintiff had gained forty-seven pounds on this diet.147 The court
informed readers that the plaintiff’s wife had to get a job, despite
the eight children at home, and one of the children was pulled from
school to manage the household and care for her severely disabled
father.148 The family was hounded by creditors, lost what few
possessions they owned, and suffered repeated suspensions of their
139. See id. at 83.
140. See id.
141. See id. at 83-88.
142. See id.
143. See id. at 81.
144. Id. at 87.
145. See id. at 90-91.
146. Id. at 91.
147. See id.
148. See id. at 88.
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utility services.149 After this recitation, the Court of Appeal con-
cluded: “It would not appear unreasonable that a person with a
prior history of industry and concern for his family would suffer
substantial emotional distress in the nature of grief, humiliation,
embarrassment, chagrin, disappointment and worry.”150 Despite
Western’s protests about causation, all this was laid at its doorstep
because of the “special relationship”151 the company had with
Fletcher. The court found obligations arising in such relationships
due to the insured’s reliance on the company and “the great
disparity in the economic situations and bargaining abilities” of the
two.152 In the end, the Court of Appeal concluded that based on all
of these facts and the previously established precedent and bad faith
protection, concomitant tort damages ought to be extended to first
party insureds.153 The panel upheld not only the jury’s compensatory
award but punitive damages in the sum of $180,000 (reduced from
the $640,000 the jury had awarded).154 The punitive component of
the award in particular underscored the jury’s distinctive role in
evaluating and regulating insurance company conduct.
The issue of first party bad faith claims came before the Califor-
nia Supreme Court in the 1973 case, Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance
Company.155 The decision, reviewing a dismissal after Aetna’s
demurrer, addressed a dispute regarding a fire insurance policy; a
different and far more legislatively structured part of the insurance
business than had been before the court in previous cases. Yet, the
themes and analysis of the majority were remarkably similar to
those set forth by the Court of Appeal in Fletcher. The decision
featured an extremely detailed recitation of the insurer’s aggressive
practices after Gruenberg’s cocktail lounge was destroyed by a fire
of “incendiary” origin.156 The company and its agents, suspecting
that Gruenberg had committed arson, claimed that he had “exces-
sive fire insurance coverage”157 and went on to provide testimony at
149. See id. at 91.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 95.
152. Id.
153. See id. at 99.
154. See id.
155. 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973).
156. Id. at 1044 (Roth, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 1035.
1084 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1061
a preliminary hearing convened to consider arson and fraud charges
against him.158 Apparently mindful of the pendency of the criminal
case and the pressure it might exert on Gruenberg, Aetna insisted
on an almost immediate deposition, on the basis of a policy provision
requiring the insured’s cooperation.159 On the advice of counsel
representing him in the criminal matter, Gruenberg declined to
appear at the deposition and Aetna cancelled the policy citing his
failure to cooperate.160 Shortly thereafter, the charges against
Gruenberg were dismissed, and he offered to appear for his
deposition.161 The company refused and reiterated its rejection of his
fire insurance claim.162 This rejection led Gruenberg to file the bad
faith claim that was then dismissed by the trial court.163
Echoing Fletcher, the Supreme Court, on the basis of the plead-
ings rather than proven facts, detailed the plaintiff’s alleged injuries
including his loss of income due to the demise of the cocktail lounge
(rendered inoperable because of a lack of insurance funds for
repairs), aggressive efforts by Gruenberg’s creditors to obtain
payment of outstanding debts, and the ruin of Gruenberg’s credit
rating.164 Similar to the Court of Appeal in Fletcher, the Supreme
Court emphasized the breadth of the bad faith principle established
in Comunale and Crisci, seeing it as expansive enough to warrant
jury scrutiny of Gruenberg’s situation.165 The court announced what
amounted to a general mandate that judges and juries examine
insurance company claims-handling processes and reject those
amounting to one-sided advantage seeking at the insured’s
expense.166 The Fletcher decision was embraced, but its partial
reliance on IIED was rejected in favor of the broad compass of
damages allowed in prior Supreme Court bad faith cases. The
upshot of the decision was that in the widest range of insurance
relationships—from third party motorist situations to first party
disability and fire cases—the courts empowered jurors to review
158. See id.
159. See id. at 1034-35.
160. See id.
161. See id. at 1035.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See id. at 1041.
165. See id. at 1037.
166. See id. at 1049.
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insurers’ handling of their customers’ claims. Insurer disregard of
customer interests, not to mention malice and misrepresentation,
would warrant liability under the rubric of bad faith including an
award of punitive damages.167 
The lone dissenter, Justice Roth, detailed the implications of the
court’s decision. Roth noted that Comunale and Crisci were third
party cases and, as such, involved companies in a clearly recognized
quasi-fiduciary relationship arising out of the insurer’s assumption
of exclusive control over the defense.168 There was no such relation-
ship in first party cases like Gruenberg. If liability were to be
recognized in Gruenberg, it would have to be on the basis of a new,
judicially-manufactured duty. The dissent pointed out that the case
before the court, unlike Fletcher, did not involve an adhesion
contract because legislation specified virtually all fire insurance
policy terms used in California.169 Justice Roth argued that
Gruenberg posed a serious question of claimant fraud, in light of the
incendiary nature of the fire, and the company did its duty by
seeking to detect and punish dishonesty.170 He challenged the
court’s invocation of the image of the innocent customer set upon
by an unscrupulous, self-interested, and unrestrained insurance
company.171
Within a year, the Supreme Court confirmed the Gruenberg
holding in Silberg v. California Life Insurance Company.172 Again,
the court emphasized the plight of a poor insured who suffered
incredible hardship because of the one-sided claims practices of his
insurer. California Life denied coverage because of the possibility
that workers’ compensation might apply and the insurance contract
made an exception from coverage in such circumstances.173 The
insurance company delayed its payment decision for two years.174 In
that time, Enrique Silberg suffered numerous medical complications
and financial hardships.175 Eventually, the hospital that had been
167. See id. at 1037.
168. Id. at 1042-43 (Roth, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 1043.
170. See id. at 1044, 1046.
171. See id. at 1045, 1047.
172. 521 P.2d 1103 (Cal. 1974).
173. Id. at 1105, 1111.
174. Id. at 1105.
175. See id. at 1106-08.
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providing care denied him treatment because of his failure to pay
his bill.176 He lost his small dry cleaning business, had his credit
destroyed, had to change residences repeatedly with his wife and
two young children, suffered two nervous breakdowns, and even had
his wheelchair repossessed.177 California Life did nothing demon-
strably underhanded in the case, but its stubborn refusal to pay set
in motion all of Mr. Silberg’s troubles. The court pointed out that
the company had taken its harsh stand despite the fact that its
economic interests were protected because any erroneous payment
could be recouped if there were a workers’ compensation award.178
The court went on to underscore the insured’s reliance on the
company’s promises, most particularly a slogan in California Life’s
policy application: “Protect Yourself Against the Medical Bills That
Can Ruin You.”179 The company’s callous refusal to consider
Silberg’s plight and its simple-minded pursuit of its selfish interest
cried out for correction—a step the court was willing to allow a jury
to consider.180 In only one regard did the California Supreme Court
show restraint. It upheld the trial judge’s rejection of a $500,000
punitive damages award.181 It did, however, approve a compensatory
award of almost $80,000.182
The punitive damages barrier was definitively surmounted by the
California Supreme Court in a first party case in 1978, Neal v.
Farmers Insurance Exchange.183 Again, the court took particular
pains to describe the facts the jury had heard detailing the sad
plight of the plaintiff and the brutal callousness of the insurer. An
uninsured motorist gravely injured the plaintiff, Neal, who then
sought payment from her insurer, Farmers Exchange.184 The
company sought to dodge its clear obligation.185 This forced the
plaintiff to pursue arbitration, which seriously delayed resolution.186
176. Id. at 1106-07.
177. Id. at 1107-08.
178. Id. at 1109.
179. Id.
180. See id. at 1108.
181. Id. at 1106. 
182. Id. at 1112.
183. 582 P.2d 980 (Cal. 1978).
184. Id. at 983-84.
185. Id. at 984.
186. See id.
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The insurer not only knew that it had no defense but that Neal’s
family was facing a separate crisis, a son with cancer.187 The son
eventually died. Farmers, with what the court described as malice,
adopted a “conscious course of [obstructive] conduct, firmly
grounded in established company policy” designed to force a low-ball
settlement.188 The California Supreme Court, agreeing with the trial
judge, ratified a nearly $750,000 jury judgment that mixed compen-
satory and punitive damages.189 Two justices dissented. The first
justice noted that the uninsured motorist in the case was not cited
for improper operation of his car and that Neal’s attorney had
heavily relied on manipulative appeals for sympathy.190 The second
justice decried the court’s interference both with the state’s
uninsured motorist scheme and the arbitration mechanism put in
place to deal with disputes—both competing approaches to regula-
tion.191 He further argued that premiums would rise for all drivers
because of windfalls awarded to a few motorists, like that given to
Neal.192 That the Supreme Court brushed these concerns aside
signaled its willingness to allow jury regulation of the full range of
insurance company behavior through the employment of compensa-
tory and punitive damage awards.
Any lingering doubts about the reach of juror appraisal of insurer
reasonableness were dispelled in 1979 in Egan v. Mutual of Omaha
Insurance Co., in which the California Supreme Court upheld a
finding of bad faith in a first party disability insurance case.193
Mutual of Omaha, following in the footsteps of so many insurer
defendants before it, attempted to take advantage of its insured to
force an unfair settlement. The insurer dragged its feet in the claims
process and was forced to admit in litigation that the file had “fallen
... into a crack.”194 In passing, the California Supreme Court noted
that the plaintiff asked the Department of Insurance to get the
insurer to review the matter, the first time the Department was
187. See id.
188. Id. at 983.
189. Id. at 985, 994.
190. Id. at 994, 996 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 999 (Clark, J., dissenting).
192. Id.
193. 620 P.2d 141 (Cal. 1979).
194. Id. at 144.
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mentioned in the bad faith series of cases.195 The court reported no
steps on the Department’s part.196 The only effective regulation
seemed to depend on a jury judgment pursuant to the doctrine of
tortious bad faith. The California Supreme Court reiterated its prior
justifications for intervention: client reliance on the insurer, the
quasi-public nature of the service promised, and a requirement of
company fair play arising because of its adhesive power and
“superior bargaining position.”197 Finally, the court presented
punitive damages as a means to “restore balance” to the relation-
ship.198 The California Supreme Court had developed a quasi-
legislative principle regarding good faith and fair dealing. The
principle empowered juries to function like regulators by making
individualized assessments of insurance company conduct.
C. The California Courts’ Articulated Justification for Last Resort
Jury Regulation
As California’s courts developed the tort of bad faith insurance
company conduct, they revealed some of the fundamental reasons
why judges may call upon juries to serve as regulators of last resort.
Two points come across most clearly: first, a deep concern for
impecunious and vulnerable insureds who suffer serious harm at
the hands of underregulated insurance companies and, second, the
self-interested and, in many cases, grossly exploitative behavior of
insurers who seem to hold virtually unlimited economic and legal
power in their relationships with customers. From the very
beginning, in 1958, the California Supreme Court displayed
sensitivity to the inability of many insureds to protect themselves
either financially or otherwise. In Comunale, the initial case in the
development of the doctrine, the court appeared to emphasize the
economic vulnerability of Percy Sloan, who apparently did not have
the resources to take advantage of a reasonable settlement offer in
the wake of his insurer’s wrongful denial of coverage.199 Sloan was
financially helpless without the assistance of the company. The
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 146.
198. Id.
199. Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198, 205 (Cal. 1958).
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theme of financial vulnerability was more specifically highlighted
in Crisci in which the company decided to “gamble with the in-
sured’s money” and in the process ruined her.200 Here, the court
expanded the reach of the tort to allow the jury to consider compen-
satory damages for the hurt caused by the company’s conduct.201 In
these cases and the ones that followed, the weak, financially and
otherwise, are overborne; lose virtually everything; and find
protection only through the jury’s consideration of the bad faith tort.
Over time, the physical and psychological costs of financial
vulnerability came, more and more, to figure in the jury’s appraisal
of bad faith claims. Concern about such harm was already apparent
in 1967, when the California Supreme Court in Crisci observed that
not only had the widowed seventy-year-old Mrs. Crisci lost all her
worldly possessions because of the insurer’s “gamble,” she had
suffered a precipitous decline in health, been seized by repeated
bouts of hysteria, and had attempted suicide.202 Although it may be
hard to imagine much more serious distress, the Fletcher and
Silberg cases provided stories of the starkest suffering. In these two
matters, in which the decades-old barrier between third and first
party liability was pushed aside, the mental and physical harm done
to the insureds was atrocious. The Fletcher court narrated a tale of
the destruction of a proud and hard-working father of eight and his
family.203 Their health was undermined, their childrens’ education
disrupted, creditors hounded them, and they fell into abject
poverty.204 The Court of Appeal listed some of the mental conse-
quences: “grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin,
disappointment, [and] worry.”205 The Silberg facts are sadly similar
featuring loss of income, interruption of medical treatment, constant
family displacement and, in an almost Dickensian touch, reposses-
sion of the insured’s wheelchair—all while the insurance company
withheld the assistance the court found it was legally obligated to
provide.206 The financial hardships to which the insurers knowingly
200. Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co. of New Haven, Conn., 426 P.2d 173, 176-77 (Cal. 1967).
201. Id. at 178-79.
202. Id. at 176-77.
203. Fletcher v. W. Nat’l Life Ins., 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 83 (1970).
204. See id. at 87.
205. Id. at 91.
206. Silberg v. Cal. Life Ins. Co., 521 P.2d 1103, 1107-08 (Cal. 1974).
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exposed their insureds clearly had consequences of the most
traumatic sort. And so the stories piled up. What the cases sug-
gested was the profound vulnerability of those seeking protection
and the damaging consequences of insurance company conduct.
The courts’ concern for the welfare of the insureds was heightened
by the fact that all had tried, through the purchase of insurance, to
protect themselves from disaster.207 The insureds had paid their
premiums and relied on company promises to provide help if they
ran into trouble. This was not a point remarked upon in Comunale,
but even there Sloan repeatedly asked his insurer for help and was
rebuffed.208 The Crisci decision tied the tort to the notion of cus-
tomer reliance, declaring: “Among the considerations in purchasing
liability insurance, as insurers are well aware, is the peace of mind
and security it will provide in the event of an accidental loss.”209
This language was picked up in Fletcher210 and was amplified in
Silberg in which the California Supreme Court stressed the reliance
rationale and quoted the defendant’s policy application inducement:
“Protect Yourself Against the Medical Bills That Can Ruin You.”211
Thwarting customer reliance and thereby destroying their promised
peace of mind were matters of great concern to the California courts.
Turning from the insured to the insurers, the story the California
courts chose to tell was one of self-regard, greed, and exploitation.
From the outset, the Supreme Court seemed deeply concerned by
the self-interested behavior of insurers. In Comunale, the court
depicted an insurer preoccupied with its own advantage and
unwilling to consider the interests of its insured despite its quasi-
fiduciary obligation to customers facing third party claims.212 This
selfish approach was condemned and, on the basis of the reasoning
in Hilker, the insurer was required to show equal regard for its
207. See, e.g., Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co. of New Haven, Conn., 426 P.2d 173, 179 (Cal. 1967)
(noting that the insured did not purchase insurance to obtain a commercial gain, but to
protect against accidental losses).
208. Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198, 200 (Cal. 1958) (noting that Sloan
notified Traders of the accident, notified them a second time when the suit was filed, and yet
a third time on the second day of trial when the plaintiffs offered to settle well within policy
limits).
209. Crisci, 426 P.2d at 179.
210. Fletcher v. W. Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 95 (1970).
211. Silberg v. Cal. Life Ins. Co., 521 P.2d 1103, 1109 (Cal. 1974).
212. Comunale, 328 P.2d at 201.
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client’s position or face the possibility of paying the full amount of
an adverse judgment despite policy limits.213 Crisci was a case in
which the company’s pursuit of its own interest was even more
readily apparent. Despite warnings from its staff, the Security
Insurance Company decided to “gamble with its client’s money” in
hopes of obtaining a verdict below the $10,000 policy limits.214
Instead, the jury awarded a sum of $100,000 that ruined the policy
holder.215 All this led the court to authorize jury consideration of a
far broader range of damages.216 The same theme runs through the
Barrera decision in which State Farm declined to spend $3.35 to
conduct a proper investigation and thereby exposed the public to
vehicular risks that the insurer would seek to disavow.217 Fletcher,
Silberg, Neal, and Egan all presented a pattern of deplorable
insurer misconduct always grounded in a desire to save the
company a bit of money by denying or delaying compensation
payments. In several cases, the conduct was far worse, involving
fraud and malicious cruelty, all in pursuit of a few more dollars.218
The pattern of insurer greed and self-interest signaled a profound
moral obtuseness on the part of those running operations in the
insurance industry. Insurers’ disregard for any interest other than
their own and exploitation of their clients’ weaknesses was already
plain in Comunale and Crisci. The risk the insurer created in
Barrera was even greater, exposing the whole public to a dangerous
driver whose harms it would deny insuring. All of this pales when
compared with the shameful conduct detailed in the later cases.
How could any decent human being conclude that it was morally
defensible to try to deprive the honest, hard-working father of eight,
Mr. Fletcher, of the $150 a month pittance the company had
contracted to pay him? How could the company’s employees, all the
way up to the president, go farther, trying to swindle and intimi-
date? Cases like Fletcher depict an unregulated environment in
which the greedy have neither shame nor fear. To that picture,
213. Id. at 200-01.
214. See Crisci, 426 P.2d at 175, 177.
215. Id. at 176.
216. See id. at 179.
217. Barrera v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 456 P.2d 674, 680 (Cal. 1969).
218. See, e.g., Neal v. Farmer’s Ins. Exch., 582 P.2d 980, 987 (Cal. 1978).
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Gruenberg added a self-interested, self-righteous, and, ultimately,
unjustified vigilantism.
Neither the market nor any existing regulatory mechanism
seemed capable of curbing these excesses. As the decisions multi-
plied, courts talked more bluntly about the unchecked power of the
insurance industry. This power was seen as springing from
substantial economic resources. Economic strength allowed insurers
to dictate adhesion contract terms in most settings as well as get
their way in most claims disputes. Financial might was augmented
by the public’s inescapable and, sometimes, legally mandated need
for insurance to drive a car, to purchase a home, or to run a
business. In light of the insured’s vulnerability, the insurers’ self-
aggrandizing economic power, and the necessity for insurance, the
California courts came to view the interchange between client and
company as a matter of public interest.219 Taking note of the
requirements of California’s Financial Responsibility Law, the
Barrera court deemed insurance a “quasi-public” activity.220 Viewed
in this light, insurance company failure to perform fairly called for
correction in the public interest. Although Egan arose in a far less
regulated setting than Barrera, the California Supreme Court
adopted the same analysis. The court found that the public interest
could not be left exclusively in the hands of an industry that had
shown itself, in case after case, to be preoccupied with its own
advantage to the exclusion of all else.221
III. THE UNARTICULATED GROUNDS FOR JUDICIAL ACTION: THE
REGULATORY VACUUM
The vulnerability of clients and the exploitativeness of insurers
were not the only bases for California’s adoption of a mechanism
that called upon juries to become last resort regulators of insurance
practices in the state. When the courts examined the insurance
business, what they found was an industry without an effective
regulatory structure.222 Despite substantial legislation regarding
219. Barrera, 456 P.2d at 682, 684.
220. Id. at 680-81.
221. Egan v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 620 P.2d 141, 146 (Cal. 1979).
222. See id. at 144 (noting that it was unclear whether the Department of Insurance
followed up with an insurer about its poor claims review process).
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uninsured motorists, insurers, as demonstrated in Barrera, were
regularly skipping background investigations and rescinding
coverage so as to deprive Californians of protection.223 Similarly, in
Gruenberg, the court found that legislatively stipulated fire
insurance policy terms failed to promote the proper balance between
the customer and the company.224 In the seminal cases that
developed the bad faith doctrine between 1958 and 1978, the
California Department of Insurance was not mentioned once. It was
as if that agency had nothing to contribute to the regulation of
company claims practice. In Egan, in 1979, the Department was
mentioned in passing but nothing ever came of the insured’s plea for
help.225 In light of the ineffective legislative and administrative
actions, an observer would be justified in concluding that there was
no place to turn for relief except the courts.
This should not come as a surprise. The insurance industry has
been remarkably successful at blocking regulation of its conduct in
handling customer claims.226 In large measure, its success is owed
to the exclusion of federal government regulators from the area, the
enactment—at industry urging—of state legislation designed to
exclude company claims practices in individual cases from adminis-
trative review, and the dogged resistance of state insurance
departments to scrutiny of consumer complaints.227 
The story of federal exclusion begins with the Supreme Court
decision in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n in
1944.228 There the Court reversed more than seventy years of
precedent and held that the insurance business was subject to
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce.229 This decision
alarmed the industry, which over decades had developed comfort-
able relationships with most state regulators and wanted nothing
to do with federal oversight by New Dealers.230 To block regulation
at the federal level, the industry and a group of state regulators
called the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
223. Barrera, 456 P.2d at 680, 684.
224. See Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 1036-38 (Cal. 1973).
225. Egan, 620 P.2d at 144.
226. Randall, supra note 9, at 632.
227. Id. at 631, 642-43.
228. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
229. Id. at 553.
230. See Randall, supra note 9, at 632-33.
1094 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1061
(NAIC)231 drafted what became known, when adopted, as the
McCarran-Ferguson Act.232 It declared that “[no] Act of Congress
shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law
enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance.”233 The Act bars any federal regulation of improper
insurance claims handling.234
Although federal involvement was anathema, the insurance
industry did have a desire for uniform laws across the states that
could shield the industry from excessive or onerous regulation and
simplify the administration of the insurance business nationally.235
To pursue these goals, NAIC drafted a string of model laws.236
NAIC’s efforts on behalf of the industry should come as no surprise
because the Association receives half of its funding from insurance
companies,237 works closely with them on the gathering of data
about the industry’s operations238 and generally has been—at least
in the industry’s view—“part of the industry and answerable to the
industry.”239 Indeed, in 1995, NAIC defined itself as “a private trade
organization.”240
As pressure began to mount in the late 1960s on the bad faith
question, NAIC set about drafting a model act to address the issue,
called the Unfair Trade Practices Act.241 Its provisions have been of
virtually no assistance to individual consumers seeking help from
231. Id. at 633-34; Steven Plitt & Christie L. Kriegsfeld, The Punitive Damages Lottery
Chase Is Over: Is There a Regulatory Alternative to the Tort of Common Law Bad Faith and
Does It Provide an Alternative Deterrent?, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1221, 1245-46 (2005).
232. The McCarran-Ferguson Act, Ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2012)); see Randall, supra note 9, at 633; see also Plitt & Kriegsfeld,
supra note 231, at 1245.
233. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b).
234. Randall, supra note 9, at 634.
235. See Randall, supra note 9, at 630 (“The history of the NAIC, from its beginning in 1871
to the present, illuminates the tension between state-level regulation and an acknowledged
need for uniformity. The NAIC’s central role in the United States system of insurance
regulation demonstrates that, for the most part, the states’ regulatory apparatus has been
unable to function appropriately as individual units because of the complex national and
international nature of the insurance industry.”).
236. Id. at 634; Plitt & Kriegsfeld, supra note 231, at 1245.
237. See Randall, supra note 9, at 639.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 640 n.90.
240. Id. at 638.
241. See Plitt & Kriegsfeld, supra note 231, at 1246-47.
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state insurance regulators.242 The Act’s declared concerns include a
desire to bar misrepresentation, to promote promptness, to encour-
age investigation, and to foster settlement.243 Yet, the Act does
virtually nothing to effectuate enforcement of those high-minded
principles. From the outset, NAIC has stressed that the Act is not
intended or designed to create a private cause of action.244 Hence, if
there is to be any enforcement of the Act, state insurance depart-
ment officials must initiate it.245 The Act, by its terms, limits
enforcement to situations when regulators find that the insurer
committed a violation “flagrantly and in conscious disregard of [the]
Act”246 or “with such frequency [as] to indicate a general business
practice.”247 These requirements demand such extensive proof as to
make a finding of an improper claim practice highly unlikely in all
but the most extreme circumstances.248 Complainants must
document repeated misconduct or prove an intention so clear as to
be beyond any doubt.249 Moreover, the main tool of enforcement is
monetary penalties generally so trivial as to amount to a gentle slap
on the wrist.250 Even so, many states have rejected the penalty
schedule and adopted even lower fines.251 Together, the NAIC Model
Act and state legislative tweaking of it have produced a set of rules
so toothless that Roger Henderson, who has written perhaps the
best analysis of the bad faith tort, concluded that the regulation has
“not materially aided the individual claimant.”252 It seems as if
NAIC and the state legislatures have been involved in a race to the
bottom to see who can offer insureds less protection, while seeming
to be responsive. Although championing a legislative solution,
Henderson, after painstaking analysis, rejected reliance on NAIC
and urged that the National Conference of Commissioners on
242. Id. at 1248.
243. Id. at 1247-48.
244. Henderson, supra note 22, at 14-15; Plitt & Kriegsfeld, supra note 231, at 1268.
245. Plitt & Kriegsfeld, supra note 231, at 1248.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. See id. at 1249-50.
249. See id. at 1249.
250. See id. at 1260.
251. Id. at 1260-61.
252. Henderson, supra note 22, at 14.
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Uniform Laws undertake an effort to fashion effective remedial
legislation.253
State insurance departments have an abysmal record in dealing
with insurance companies’ claims-related misconduct. The Califor-
nia Supreme Court seemed to suggest the ineffectiveness of the
State Department of Insurance in its passing reference to that
agency in the Egan case.254 The lack of agency responsiveness
suggested in Egan is in no way unusual. In a 1988 dissent in
Moradi-Shalai v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co., Justice Stanley
Mosk of the California Supreme Court noted that since 1959, when
California adopted its own unfair claims practice statute, there had
not been “a single case reported in which the Insurance Commis-
sioner has taken disciplinary action against a carrier for ‘unfair and
deceptive acts or practices in the business of insurance’ involving a
claimant.”255 Moreover, a 1997 audit found that the California
Department of Insurance had a backlog of 5000 consumer com-
plaints while the Department was cutting staff beyond already
inadequate levels.256
In the nation as a whole, Henderson has found that individual
insureds “seldom [can] obtain timely relief by complaining to the
state ... regulator.”257 NAIC compiled national statistics from 2007
that confirm this conclusion and almost certainly understate the
problem.258 In that year consumers lodged 222,000 complaints with
state insurance departments.259 Of these complaints, 126,000 were
described as “confirmed.”260 Of this number, 0.4 percent were sent
to market conduct divisions for follow-up and enforcement.261 There
are a number of reasons for nonenforcement, and they have proven
crippling. Most insurance departments are woefully understaffed
and simply do not have the personnel for investigation and enforce-
253. Id. at 64-65.
254. Egan v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 620 P.2d 141, 144 (Cal. 1979).
255. 758 P.2d 58, 77 (Cal. 1988) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
256. See Randall, supra note 9, at 662.
257. Henderson, supra note 22, at 15.
258. See Daniel Schwarcz, Redesigning Consumer Dispute Resolution: A Case Study of the
British and American Approaches to Insurance Claims Conflict, 83 TUL. L. REV. 735, 750-51
(2009).
259. Id.
260. Id. at 751.
261. See id. at 753.
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ment.262 It has been estimated that almost half of all insurance
departments are incapable of processing all of the complaints they
receive.263 For example, between 1993 and 1997, the Indiana
Insurance Department received 21,000 complaints.264 In response,
the Department issued 211 warnings and initiated one disciplinary
action.265 Colorado’s agency received 7000 complaints in 1996 and
levied seven fines.266 Most departments have no serious wish to get
involved in consumer protection.267 They are, in many cases,
captives of the industry they regulate and are strongly disposed to
take the industry’s side.268 Most agencies take the position that they
have no authority to require insurance companies to settle claims.269
Agencies generally strive to avoid any action that might be con-
strued as a regulatory decision that could either create enforceable
precedent or be subject to judicial review.270 Insurance companies
understand the toothless nature of the enforcement mechanism and,
in the majority of cases, refuse to compromise on complaints.271 Only
seventeen states require insurance companies even to keep records
of complaints regarding improper claims handling.272 The other
thirty-three states deprive those who might provide oversight with
any real record of problematic behavior.273 The consequence of this
regulatory vacuum is the deployment of judges and juries to review
insurance company claims practices.274 As Henderson put it: “[T]he
recognition of the tort of bad faith in insurance cases represents a
judicial response to the perceived failure of the other branches of
government to regulate adequately the claims processes of the
insurance industry.”275
262. See id. at 756-57.
263. Id. at 757.
264. See Randall, supra note 9, at 661.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 662.
267. See Schwarcz, supra note 258, at 757.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 753.
270. Id. at 755.
271. Id. at 755-56.
272. See Plitt & Kriegsfeld, supra note 231, at 1267.
273. Id.
274. Henderson, supra note 22, at 11.
275. Id.
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What California started with Comunale, Gruenberg, and the cases
following them swept the nation’s courts. By the early 1990s, half of
the country’s state supreme courts had embraced some version of
the bad faith tort,276 underscoring the judiciary’s widespread concern
about the lack of regulatory protection for insurance customers.
Reports from a variety of sources have remarked on the durable
nature of the tort in terms of filings and awards.277 Although this
has been a cause for alarm to both those in the industry and those
who represent it,278 it has not been a spur to action for any agency
or branch of government besides the judiciary. Courts continue to
be presented with case after case of insurer oppression and miscon-
duct.279
The regulatory intervention undertaken by juries, under the
supervision of judges, attracts serious criticism. Critics argue that
the balance between consumer and company is tipped too far in
favor of the insured, creating the possibility, most particularly with
large punitive damages awards, of undermining the “financial
vitality” of the industry and raising the cost of insurance.280 With
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell,  eliminating as a matter of
constitutional principle the possibility of extremely large punitive
awards,281 the power of this criticism is substantially blunted. In
passing, it might be noted that the conduct at issue in Campbell
was, despite the Supreme Court’s avoidance of a close examination,
bad faith of the most troubling sort, tied to a major insurance
corporation’s scheme to boost profits by oppressing customers.282 The
276. Id. at 26-28.
277. See, e.g., Alan O. Sykes, “Bad Faith” Breach of Contract By First-Party Insurers, 25
J. LEGAL STUD. 405, 406 (1996).
278. See, e.g., Douglas R. Richmond, Bad Insurance Bad Faith Law, 39 TORT TRIAL & INS.
PRAC. L.J. 1, 1 (2003); James A. Varner, Sr., Tiffany R. Drust & Debra T. Herron, Institutional
Bad Faith: The Darth Vader of Extra-Contractual Litigation, 57 FED’N DEF. & CORP. COUNS.
Q. 163, 163 (2007) (“Institutional bad faith is the ‘Ebola’ virus of extra contractual litigation.
Darth Vader manages the field hospital and it is completely run by plaintiffs.”). Although the
metaphors are mixed, and the grammar dubious, the import is fairly clear.
279. See, e.g., Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134, 1150 (Utah 2001).
280. Henderson, supra note 22, at 32.
281. 538 U.S. 408, 409 (2003).
282. Campbell, 65 P.3d at 1148 (detailing State Farm’s “pattern of ‘trickery and deceit,’
‘false statements,’ and other ‘acts of affirmative misconduct’ targeted at ‘financially
vulnerable’ persons”) (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575, 576 (1996)).
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Utah Supreme Court, a generally conservative body, concluded that
State Farm’s behavior warranted the most severe punishment.283
The recent history of the insurance industry does not bear out the
claim that tort liability—or anything else for that matter—leads to
industry timidity or even appropriate caution.284 In the 1980s, there
was a rash of insurance company insolvencies.285 Congressional
investigation of the failures uncovered a wide range of improper
practices, among them “false reports, reckless management, gross
incompetence, fraudulent activity, greed, and self-dealing.”286 These
are precisely the sorts of behaviors found in the bad faith cases,
although it should be noted that the congressional materials were
not specifically focused on the treatment of claimants.287 In the mid-
1990s, a stunning example of the bad faith problem came to light in
the UNUM/Provident scandal, in which “the largest American
insurer specializing in disability insurance[ ] was engaged in a
deliberate program of bad faith denial of meritorious benefit
claims.”288 This reprehensible scheme was, for the most part,
shielded from judicial detection and correction by ERISA rules that
cut off access to punitive damages and other remedies available in
bad faith actions.289 And so the story continued into the new century
as the reprehensible bad faith of the State Farm Insurance Com-
pany was uncovered in the Campbell case.
The bad faith tort engenders particularly sharp criticism from
legal scholars with a law and economics orientation. Some argue
that the tort is likely to increase insurance premiums, stifle efforts
to prevent fraud, and introduce inefficiencies into the claims
adjusting process.290 It is of course true that calling insurance
companies to account for misconduct may make their operations
more expensive or less profitable. Unfortunately, the industry has
283. Id. at 1148-49.
284. See Randall, supra note 9, at 642.
285. Id.
286. Id. (quoting STAFF OF THE H.R. SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE
COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 101ST CONG., FAILED PROMISES: INSURANCE COMPANY
INSOLVENCIES (Comm. Print 1990)).
287. See, e.g., Campbell, 65 P.3d at 1148.
288. John H. Langbein, Essay, Trust Law as Regulatory Law: The UNUM/Provident
Scandal and Judicial Review of Benefit Denials Under ERISA, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1315, 1315
(2007).
289. Id. at 1319.
290. Sykes, supra note 277, at 426-27.
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not shown itself capable of operating reliably or fairly without such
interventions. The California cases, Campbell, and the UNUM
scandal amply testify to the need for oversight. In the vacuum
created by insurance department inactivity and legislative timidity,
the courts are the only institution seemingly up to the regulatory
challenge. Given recent history, the burden of proof should be borne
by those seeking what is, in essence, deregulation.
The fraud claim is open to serious doubt too. Evidence suggests
that there is a great deal of claimant insurance fraud.291 In the face
of that fraud, which has been going on for decades, the insurance
industry has undertaken few vigorous curative steps.292 The issue
appears to provide companies with a convenient excuse for delaying
payments to honest customers and low-balling claimants.293 At least
several insurers, including State Farm in Campbell and UNUM,
seem to have given in to the temptation to commit fraud. It is hard
to accredit a claim that such companies, if left to their own devices,
will be efficient and dedicated fraud fighters. They show the
opposite propensity—to pursue easy profits at the expense of their
most vulnerable customers, using fraud claims as a convenient
excuse. Moreover, the structure of the insurance industry appears
to make it easier to raise insurance rates than to vigorously pursue
fraud.294
Some scholars worry that the bad faith tort undermines insurance
industry efficiency in claims processing by rendering each step in
the process a potential basis for liability.295 This argument is
grounded on an unsupported assumption that insurance companies
are ready, willing, and able to design and implement fair and
efficient claims processing schemes. They do not appear to have
seized the opportunity to do so. If efficiency requires unfairness,
delay, and cruelty—all of which have been repeatedly reported in
the bad faith cases296—one can legitimately ask: “What is such
efficiency worth and to whom?” 
291. Id. at 434.
292. See Richmond, supra note 278, at 1-3.
293. See Plitt & Kriegsfeld, supra note 231, at 1222.
294. Henderson, supra note 22, at 32.
295. Sykes, supra note 277, at 438-39. 
296. See, e.g., Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134, 1150 (Utah 2001).
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IV. ANOTHER RELATIONSHIP WARRANTING JURY REGULATION?
The reasons for developing the bad faith tort become fairly clear
when the circumstances of the California cases and the absence of
effective regulation are considered. The tort’s durability suggests
that things have not changed very much and that last resort jury
regulation is still needed in the interaction between insurers and
insured. A question that arises is whether there might be other
relationships where such a remedy is necessary. The factors that
trigger concern include a vulnerable population that must avail
itself of the services of financially powerful partners, the use of
adhesion contracts by those partners, the absence of effective
regulation, and interactions requiring that the bona fides of claims
be determined. This describes the conditions that exist between
customers and employees on the one side and large business
corporations on the other, where compulsory arbitration has been
imposed by adhesion contract.
Since the middle of the 1980s, the United States Supreme Court
has been expanding the reach of compulsory arbitration through its
interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).297 The prece-
dents so far indicate that adhesion contracts with imposed arbitra-
tion clauses will be enforced in the widest array of cases, compelling
arbitration not only of disputes about contract terms but most
statutory claims as well.298 According to the Supreme Court, the
FAA established a “federal policy favoring arbitration”299 that
requires courts to “rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate.”300
Generally, the agreement to arbitrate terminates access to the
courts and compels the use of private arbitration proceedings that
are secret and unreviewable (at least as a general matter).301 The
agreement that requires this shift to arbitration may be imposed by
297. Federal Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended
at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982)); see Stephan Landsman, ADR and the Cost of Compulsion, 57 STAN.
L. REV. 1593, 1603 (2005).
298. See, e.g., Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (holding
that disputants with claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act may be compelled to arbitrate).
299. Id. at 226 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
24 (1983)).
300. Id. (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)).
301. See Landsman, supra note 297, at 1594.
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means of lengthy boilerplate contracts, may be incorporated by
reference to documents outside the original contract, or plastered on
shrink wrap packaging.302 Compulsory arbitration agreements have
become ubiquitous, governing consumer transactions involving the
services of telecommunications providers,303 the use of credit cards,
and a wide range of other activities.304
A number of states are deeply concerned about the unfairness of
compulsory arbitration clauses, especially in circumstances of
unequal bargaining power. Through legislation some have sought
to regulate the use of such mechanisms.305 For the most part, such
regulation has been invalidated as violative of the FAA.306 Not only
are the states barred from regulating the imposition of arbitration
agreements, it would appear that they are not even free to require
that compulsory arbitration agreements be set forth in contract
formats that are either clear or prominent.307 Arbitration is further
insulated from regulation because there are no government agencies
that have authority over these private adjudicatory proceedings.308
What rules there are come from private entities like the American
Arbitration Association (AAA), the members of which provide
arbitration services.309
The arbitration setting is characterized by conditions quite
similar to those previously noted in the insurance claims process.
The parties upon whom arbitration is imposed are, like insureds,
the financially less powerful who have little choice about the terms
302. See Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 682 (1996); Jean R. Sternlight,
Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury
Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 669, 698-703 (2001).
303. See Judith Resnik, Comment, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v.
Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 122 (2011).
304. See, e.g., Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative
Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 1031 (2000); David S.
Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights
Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 36.
305. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 2-3 (1984) (invalidating California
legislation restricting compulsory arbitration in franchisor/franchisee relationships).
306. Id.
307. See Doctor’s Assocs., Inc., 517 U.S. at 683 (invalidating a Montana statute requiring
boldface type to warn adhering parties about arbitration requirement).
308. Schwartz, supra note 304, at 80-81.
309. See Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 624-27 (2012); Resnik, supra note 303,
at 109.
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imposed upon them.310 They, like their insurance customer counter-
parts, are vulnerable to the economic and legal strength of their
contractual partners.311 Although job tenure, statutory rights, or
substantial monetary claims may be involved, adhering parties have
few, if any, options outside of arbitration.312 Like those who are
dependent on insurance company claims processes, adhering parties
must proceed in the way their contract and their potential adver-
sary demands. As the stakes grow, so does the likelihood that the
proceedings will have an emotional, or perhaps even physical,
impact on the adhering party (as was the case in the insurance
context).313 The adherents have no alternatives so, by necessity, they
must pursue arbitration if they hope to secure vindication.
Those who impose arbitration requirements are, for the most
part, free to craft procedures that further their own objectives.314
Through such agreements many contract drafters have insulated
themselves from class actions315 and jury trials.316 The corporate
creators of arbitration procedures are free to design and put in place
the mechanisms that will be employed.317 This places them in a
position strikingly like that occupied by insurance companies, which
may specify and put in place the claims procedures that will be
used.318 In the arbitration world, the private providers usually
employed to carry out the adjudicatory function often have a history
of congeniality towards business.319 Finally, as with insurance
claims, the costs associated with adjudication may be so high as to
discourage most adhering parties from seeking relief.320
It should come as no surprise that the adhesion power fostered by
the FAA is abused by some contract drafters or that the arbitration
mechanisms established by some cause significant financial,
physical, and emotional harm to those required to adhere. Two
310. Landsman, supra note 297, at 1601-02, 1604.
311. See id.
312. See id.
313. See id. at 1623-25.
314. See id. at 1594-99.
315. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1752 (2011); Gilles &
Friedman, supra note 309, at 627.
316. See Landsman, supra note 297, at 1611.
317. Id. at 1601-02.
318. See id. at 1608-11.
319. See id. at 1614-18.
320. Id. at 1617-18.
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examples may suffice. The first involves the Hooters restaurant
chain. It used its dominant position to impose an arbitration
requirement upon its employees with respect to all sorts of claims,
whether contractual or statutory.321 It went on to insist that all
arbitrators be selected from a list compiled exclusively by Hooters,
that only Hooters could seek summary disposition, that only the
company was allowed to make a record of the arbitration proceed-
ings, and that only the corporation could seek a court determination
that an arbitrator exceeded his authority.322 The Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals found this so-called arbitration mechanism “a
sham”323 and allowed the adhering employee to move her discrimi-
nation claim against Hooters to court. What the appellate court did
not do was in any way sanction the company for its attempt to
oppress its employee or punish it for its effort to stifle claims.324
Hooters seemed to set out to thwart all claims. This was a winning
economic strategy because even when the company’s process was
invalidated, the legal challenge took years and came to a successful
conclusion only after large numbers of employees had been deterred
from making a claim or had their claims rejected in a “sham”
process.325 The company faced no financial or legal deterrent save a
judgment on the merits of an already valid legal claim.326
If the sort of abuse Hooters engaged in is to be deterred and
punished, there is need for a tort action capable of identifying and
responding to the bad faith manipulation of the arbitration mecha-
nism as a distinct wrong that courts may address. Otherwise, there
is no reason for a company ever to resist the temptation to deter its
employees from seeking legal relief against it by means of a stacked
arbitration process. The damages awarded for such a wrong need to
be sufficient not only to compensate for the breach of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing implicit in every contract,327 but the
321. See Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 935-36 (4th Cir. 1999).
322. Id. at 936-39.
323. Id. at 940.
324. See id. at 941.
325. Id. at 940.
326. See id. at 941.
327. See Henderson, supra note 22, at 22; Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d
198, 200 (Cal. 1958) (“There is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every
contract that neither party will do anything which will injure the right of the other to receive
the benefits of the agreement.”).
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physical suffering and mental harm an employee can prove she
experienced in dealing with a mechanism designed to oppress her.
The basis for such a tort is the same as that relied upon by the
California courts in the first party bad faith insurance cases. In both
settings, protection is warranted because of the economic and legal
advantages of the contract drafter, the reliance of the vulnerable
adhering party, and the company’s demonstrated exploitative or
oppressive designs.328 Moreover, in both settings the company
breached a significant public policy or obligation, in the former case
fixed by a host of socially-generated insurance demands, in the
latter by depriving the adhering party of access to justice and a jury
trial—rights of the highest value.329 This should not be construed as
an argument for a generalized bad faith tort in the employment or
consumer claims area. Courts have properly found these to be too
amorphous or regulated to warrant such an intrusion.330 Rather, it
targets a specific sort of abusive conduct in which an employer or
distributor of goods and services manipulates the design of an
arbitration mechanism to deprive adherents of access to legal
protection.
There is a second situation in which the bad faith mechanism
should be imported into the compulsory arbitration context. This
is illustrated by Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc.331
Permanente created a proprietary arbitration process between itself
and the patients it served under a healthcare contract.332 Engalla
was compelled by contract to seek arbitration after a medical
malpractice claim arose regarding Permanente’s provision of care.333
Permanente designed and operated its arbitration system in a
manner that purposely delayed consideration of Engalla’s claim
328. See Landsman, supra note 297, at 1623-25.
329. See, e.g., Hooters, 173 F.3d at 941; Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65
P.3d 1134, 1150 (Utah 2001).
330. For more discussion, see Matthew J. Barrett, “Contort”: Tortious Breach of the Implied
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Noninsurance, Commercial Contracts-Its
Existence and Desirability, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 510, 525-26 (1985); see also Foley v.
Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 418 (Cal. 1988) (holding there is no tort cause of action
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in an employment contract
to employees who allege they were discharged in violation of the covenant); Egan v. Mut. of
Omaha Ins. Co., 620 P.2d 141, 145-46 (Cal. 1979).
331. 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997).
332. Id. at 909-10.
333. Id.
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until he had died.334 Once disclosed, Permanente’s money-saving
gambit so outraged Californians that legislation was proposed and
adopted limiting waiting time for arbitration hearings and creating
an arbitration bypass if the statutory period was exceeded.335
Although helpful, this regulation came too late for Engalla, and,
one may speculate, for hundreds of other patients victimized by
Permanente. Again, the facts of vulnerability, oppression, and
absence of regulation cry out for the bad faith tort solution. The
patients involved were clearly vulnerable, in this case physically
and emotionally as well as monetarily.336 It is not hard to imagine
how Engalla felt as the last few months of his life slipped away
without a hearing to consider his claim. He, like so many in the
insurance cases, had no opportunity to go elsewhere. He was
completely dependent on Permanente, and they exploited his
vulnerability to dodge their responsibility.337 To recognize a bad
faith claim here would be to impose some regulation, although
modest, on an otherwise unregulated party and create incentives for
rejecting oppressive but financially tempting schemes.
There is already California precedent considering the abuse of
arbitration proceedings, albeit as part of a bad faith insurance case.
In Richardson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corporation, the
insurer refused payment of a first party claim involving injuries
caused by an uninsured motorist.338 Knowing that the claim was
valid, the company nevertheless “forced an arbitration hearing” and,
thereafter, sought to evade paying the arbitration award.339 This
course of conduct was considered bad faith by the California Court
of Appeal.340 The connection between the insurance and arbitration
realms here is made clear and the appropriateness of sanctions
endorsed. Richardson does not focus on arbitration alone but does
334. Id. at 912-13; see Thomas J. Stipanowich, Contract and Conflict Management, 2001
WIS. L. REV. 831, 898.
335. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1373.20 (West 2000); Marc A. Rodwin, Backlash
as Prelude to Managing Managed Care, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1115, 1118 (1999)
(citing Landsman, supra note 297, at 1614 n.164).
336. See Engalla v. Permanente Med. Grp. Inc., 938 P.2d 903, 931-32 (Cal. 1997).
337. See id. at 909-10.
338. 102 Cal. Rptr. 547, 550 (1972).
339. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 1037 (Cal. 1973) (describing insurer’s
behavior in Richardson v. Emp’rs Liab. Assurance Corp., 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973)).
340. Id. at 1032.
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recognize its potential to become oppressive.341 It, along with
Hooters and Permanente, all bring into focus the harm that can be
done to vulnerable adhering parties in the virtually unregulated
compulsory arbitration context and the appeal of extending the bad
faith tort into an area where no other effective regulation exists.
CONCLUSION
Since the late 1950’s courts, particularly in California, have called
upon juries to scrutinize the claims-paying behavior of insurance
companies. When juries found bad faith or an absence of fair
dealing, they were empowered to award a range of damages,
covering not only the monetary losses of the insured but the
emotional and physical trauma they suffered because of the
wrongful denial of claims.342 In egregious cases punitive damages
were permitted as well.343
Juries are called on to regulate these interactions for a number of
reasons. The first is a concern for impecunious insureds, who are
vulnerable to serious harm when the insurer they have relied upon
turns on them. The second is the greed and exploitative behavior of
insurers who, all too often, adopt strategies designed to enhance the
bottom line while disregarding fairness and, in many cases, decency.
The courts turn to juries to regulate insurance company conduct
because no other governmental body is willing and able to handle
the task. State insurance departments sedulously avoid consumer
protection and legislatures show little sympathy for the plight of the
insured.344 Courts put in place a vague and expansive tort remedy
that empowers juries to function like a regulatory agency to closely
examine insurer behavior.345 Their case-by-case review  establishes
a regulatory framework to curtail insurance company overreaching.
The insurance company context is not the only one where
vulnerable consumers face extremely powerful counterparts with
adhesion power and financial incentives to oppress. Customers and
employees required, under the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
341. Id. at 1037.
342. See, e.g., Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134, 1172 (Utah 2001).
343. See, e.g., id.
344. See Plitt & Kriegsfeld, supra note 231, at 1267.
345. See Henderson, supra note 22, at 11.
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the Federal Arbitration Act, to arbitrate an extremely wide array of
claims are in virtually the same situation. They too need the
protection of the jury as a last resort regulator.
